This paper analyses a research topic poorly considered by authors interested in the legitimacy of environmental governance, that is to say the dynamics created by its interpretation by private sector actors. In order to fill this gap, a recent decision of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) -decision VIII/17 adopted in Marsh 2006-to further involve the private sector in the activities of the Convention is considered. The legitimacy of decision VIII/17 is twofold. Its first dimension requires the consideration of the impact it has on private sector activities related to the CBD. A multi-dimensional definition of legitimacyinput and output-is used to cover the whole range of possible interactions. The second one is linked to the legitimisation processes it might create inside the business community. This second dimension is crucial as there is a risk to see the decision reinterpreted and bypassed by private actors.
Introduction
Global environmental governance suffers from at least three deficits: the weakness and nonbinding nature of global environmental regulations; the lack of representativeness in the adoption of environmental norms; and the difficult implementation of its established rules and principles (Haas, 2004) . The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is no exception to this "crisis" of environmental governance and its Secretariat continuously develops new initiatives to address these weaknesses. A new ruling -decision VIII/17 -requesting some further involvement of the private sector in the activities of the CBD is part of these developments. Many Parties to the Convention, like the government of Brazil or the United Kingdom (UK) welcomed the involvement of business actors in biodiversity governance, whereas other stakeholders such as some environmental non governmental organisations (ENGOs) warned the Parties about the "entry of the foxes in the henhouse" 2 .
The possible privatisation of global governance is at the core of the debates in global environmental governance studies. The legitimacy of the involvement of the private sector in the elaboration of norms intended for controlling its activities is strongly questioned.
Environmental governance needs to establish precise rules to be followed by the private sector; but at the same time private sector representatives increasingly seem to be part of the solution to global environmental problems. Contributing to this debate, this paper examines the legitimacy of decision VIII/17 of the CBD 3 . This legitimacy is twofold: its first dimension requires the consideration of the content of decision VIII/17 and its impact on private sector activities related to the CBD. The second one is linked to the legitimisation processes it might create inside the business community. This second dimension is crucial as the CBD possesses no binding compliance mechanism. There is consequently a risk to see the decision reinterpreted and bypassed by private actors.
In order to analyse these two questions, the study uses a multi-dimensional definition of legitimacy based on its input and output dimensions. Input legitimacy refers to the responsibility of private actors towards environmental governance as well as the legitimacy of the decision processes they are involved in; output legitimacy assesses their participation in the implementation of global environmental regimes. The consideration of these multiple dimensions helps to evaluate the legitimisation processes at stake in the governance of the CBD. For each dimension of legitimacy considered, the text of decision VIII/17 and the reactions of private representatives towards such a text are assessed.
The paper proceeds as follow. The first part exposes the theoretical implications of the analysis. A short summary of the emergence of decision VIII/17 is then provided in order to contextualise the decision. Finally, the different dimensions of legitimacy are considered as well as the impact decision VIII/17 and its interpretation by private actors have on each of them. The study has some expected and unexpected results: on the one hand, some business representatives are trying to de-legitimise the CBD by ignoring its principles and lobbying against its institutional development; on the other hand, the growing involvement of business actors seem to formalise their interactions with the CBD governance system in a more constructive way. Some differences emerge among business representatives, which depend on the sectors involved, the origin of the companies as well as their internal governance and attitude towards CBD issues. In that perspective, some components of decision VIII/17 can be seen as potentially beneficial to a more effective implementation of the Convention whereas some others might be far more problematic.
Key propositions: the multi-dimensions of legitimacy and the "contested firm"
International Relations' studies got belatedly interested in the question of the legitimacy of international regimes. Such a concept requires indeed the consideration of regimes as independent sources of norms, the implementation of which isn't based on coercion as a primary resource but on the free consent of the nation states that fall under their regulations.
The discipline of International Relations has initially developed an understanding of international politics in terms of power relations, especially in the realist tradition, as well as in terms of economic interests, in the liberal tradition (Krasner, 1983) . In both cases though, international organisations are primarily seen as agents of state's interests. The development and persistence of regimes as international normative frameworks led however to an analysis of international organisations as independent bodies regulating the global system of international governance (Biernman and Bauer, 2005) . Inspired in part by constructivist approaches, and recognising this autonomy, several authors question the democratic character of international rule-making and currently centre their analyses on participation and deliberation in the negotiations' processes of regime formation (Risse, 2004) .
These considerations intertwine with the work that has been done on the legitimacy of private actors' participation to international environmental regimes. Several authors considered the involvement of civil society in the elaboration of international conventions, a topic that rose in the 1990s, as a great novelty specific to the environmental realm (Bodansky, 1999; Humphrey et al., 2003) . Some other studies centred their focus on the emergence of purely private regimes (Haufler, 2001) . Implicitly, these studies tended to validate a onedimensional definition of legitimacy. On the one hand, the involvement of civil society actors is legitimate as they represent the concerns and positions of common citizens; on the other hand, the involvement of private actors that control a wide range of material resources and are linked to powerful elites, is controversial. Soon, the overly simplistic character of this conception of legitimacy was recognised. Legitimacy isn't given a priori to the actors but has to be constructed and represents a powerful resource for political action. Instead of considering the question: "is the participation of the private sector fair?" in global environmental governance, what matters is how it is justified. The sociological dimension of legitimacy is therefore privileged over the normative dimension (Berstein, 2001) 4 .
In parallel to these developments on the legitimacy of private actors, recent studies in international relations (Backstrand, 2006; Risse, 2004) inspired by some European studies on legitimacy (Sharpf, 2001) propose to adopt an horizontal definition of the concept to assess the legitimacy of international institutions. This definition is declined in two dimensions:
internal and external legitimacy. Internal legitimacy resides in the accountability of the actors themselves as well as in their involvement in the decision making process: to which extent does it create a balanced representation of all stakeholders in a favourable deliberative environment, and to which extent such participation enhances the transparency of information 4 But studying legitimacy requires some precaution. It is indeed nearly impossible not to introduce personal judgements while considering the question of legitimacy (Mulligan 2005) . Without pretending to be completely neutral, the approach used in this paper has for aim to break down the concept and to demonstrate its varied dynamics thanks to a precise illustration of its claims through examples issued from the adoption of decision VIII/17.
exchanges. External legitimacy refers to the contribution made by the actors to the effectiveness of the norms adopted and declines itself into two different aspects: the question of the adaptation and adequateness of the involvement of private actors for the reinforcement of the institutional frame of the regime; the question of the implementation of environmental norms thanks to the engagement of private actors: are they fulfilling the initial environmental targets elaborated? These components of legitimacy are generally developed separately in the literature. On the contrary, it is their consideration as a whole and throughout the CBD development 5 that represents the major contribution of this paper.
This paper argues that to acknowledge the diversity of components of legitimacy is the first step towards a full understanding of the stakes linked to decision VIII/17. The impact of the decision on each dimension of the legitimacy of the CBD must be considered as well as its interpretation by private actors. Accepting such a definition as well as recognising the sociological dimension of the legitimacy of private actors allows the formulation of the hypothesis that different actors will develop and mobilise different kinds of arguments to justify and construct their legitimacy. This is true for different types of non-state actors, business representatives included. When studying corporations' involvement in environmental issues it seems indeed that many conflicts and social interactions can occur inside and outside the business realm. In a systematic and detailed analysis, these conflicts have been studied by the "business conflict school", an approach recognising that the so called "private sector" may include a wide variety of actors, the interests of which diverge when facing different issues (Falkner, 2001) . These splits can separate industry representatives developing new environmental approaches from the ones focused on lobbying and "business-as-usual" activities; but it can also involve differences between sectors in terms of activity, size, or even origin. Some scholars noted also that, more than differences along the supply chain and economic choices, the origin of the companies and their lobbying styles can be of relevance in the construction of business political positions and actions Coen, 2005: 211) . Using Karl Polanyi's work on historical and contextual contingency of social action and its further developments in International Political Economy, Louise
Amoore proposes to study in what she calls "the contested firm" the social relations when taking place within the corporation, across different corporations or between corporations and 5 Is it worth noting that there has been very few studies of the past and actual involvement of business actors in the CBD. This is particularly problematic to assess the potential consequences of decision VIII/17. This paper also tries to fill this gap by presenting the history of private sector involvement in the CBD as a starting point for each dimensions of legitimacy.
governments. This agenda seems to be of particular interest in the case of corporations' involvement in environmental issues such as the ones raised by the CBD. It also offers an interesting framework to bring together and further develop former attempts to tackle the issue of social and power relations among business representatives. As Amoore suggests, studying the actor's level in the construction of political action reinstitutes the importance of micro-social factors in the negotiation process as well as cultural specificity of private actors.
The companies are no longer perceived as inherent political actors, rather it is the interactions between their economical and political natures that determine and constraint their actions.
COP8's decision to further involve the private sector represents a precise and pertinent case study to analyse the engagement of private actors in international environmental governance.
The context in which this decision emerged is important to study the role of private sectors'
representatives towards its development. It is briefly assessed in the next section.
An overview of the emergence of decision VIII/17
The CBD has always considered the potential for involving private sector's representatives in and relies on the awareness and good will of industries 8 . The CBD has no coercive instruments to ensure compliance and corporations are therefore free to recognise/or not its recommendations.
7 Even if another interpretation could be that business is able to be ahead of regulations specially when it developed a new environmental product. 8 Another "soft" mechanism in the decision is to ask for further actions to raise corporations' awareness of the importance of biodiversity for their activities. The purpose is to make them aware of the convention's topics, and to invite them to take implementation measures. Moreover point 4 of decision VIII/17 suggests to make the private sector as a target of CBD's outreach materials and to include it in the global initiative for Public Communication, Education and Awareness.
It is worth pointing out that, during COP8, the section of the text dealing with business' impacts on biodiversity has been the subject of intense lobbying by some business representatives who wanted this reference deleted 9 . A closer look at the history of the The private sector is more cautious when knowing the risks such as being blamed for its aggressive attitude 10 and for its environmental impact, and being accused of "green 9 Observation data during COP8. 10 During fieldwork at CBD meetings, "aggressive" was the most recurrent adjective used by stakeholders to characterise business' initial behaviour at the beginning of the negotiations. Coupled with its alleged obstinacy washing" 11 . This is reflected in the reactions of several business representatives during the discussion of decision VIII/17. One representative of a multinational oil company explained that his first concern was that whatever commitment the private sector was taking in the decision, it would have to implement it. Along the same line, a representative of the International Chamber of Commerce explained that reporting on private sector's actions was as important as the actions themselves. Another private representative asked that the same kind of commitments contained in decision VIII/17 be undertaken by all other participants to the meeting in order to share the additional burden.
Vulnerability is particularly relevant for industries commercialising products that have an important impact on biodiversity or are directly derived from natural resources. These companies feel a particularly strong accountability to the market, with the threats of boycotts or campaigns against their products. One interesting example is that of products resulting from the use of genetic resources. The representatives of bioprospecting companies got less and less involved in the CBD debates, precisely because of the hostile atmosphere they were exposed to when attending the meetings and the consequences these protests had on their activities. Pressures by civil society have also had a huge impact on the commercialisation of products containing Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) (Kess and Sieta, 2004) .
The financial component of horizontal accountability is also at the core of the legitimacy of industries as actors in international environmental regulations. Financial or insurance sectors' mobilisation on biodiversity conservation would be of particular interest as these sectors present some potentialities to influence global economic trends (Levy and Newell, 2005: 249-274) . Investments by such corporations regularly exceed the money nation-states invest in sustainable development. To impose some environmental conditionality to these financial flows would have a positive impact on biodiversity.
The first B&B meeting underlined the importance of the implication of the financial sector in the Convention. Its report listed the possible activities the Secretariat could carry out to further involve these companies. It was initially about integrating biodiversity into financial in opposing any CBD agreement, especially the Cartagena protocol, this gave a very bad reputation to private representatives as negotiators. The current behaviour of business representatives in the CBD meetings can be read as attempts to overcome this reputation. 11 "Green washing" is a denunciation of the so-called "beneficial actions for the environment" undertaken by corporations while continuing in parallel their usual activities. A further involvement of the private sector in the CBD could evolve towards an increasing accountability of corporations in some domains, but would be less visible in some others. The recognition of the impact corporations have on biodiversity found in decision VIII/17 generated diverse corporate reactions: some groups, as in the case of the B&B initiative, could understand that being opposed to the CBD did not serve their cause and were ready to 12 The last Business and Biodiversity Newsletter edited by the SCBD is on the banking sector.
engage constructively in its activities; whereas others tend to be less keen to collaborate 13 .
This demonstrates that not all industrial sectors are ready to commit themselves to biodiversity conservation. The impact of the Convention in terms of market regulations are however affecting all corporations and the formalisation of the relations between the CBD and the industries could lead to a better visibility of the activities of all groups on the international scene. The final text of decision VIII/17 has however no reference to the financial sector.
After considering the legitimacy of private corporations' representatives as such, the legitimacy of the CBD decision-making dynamics is considered: participation on the one hand and transparency on the other hand.
An improved representation for a constructive participation
As mentioned above, CBD decisions are made by consensus among parties. However, the observatory status is granted to international organisations, scientific associations and non governmental organisations interested in the negotiations. Without the right to take part in the official agreement, they inform and advise state delegations on their positions. Sometimes, non-state actors can be integrated into these national delegations 14 .
The issue of participation has been at the core of the debates concerning environmental decision-making since the Rio Summit in 1992. A common assumption is that a broader participation would foster the implementation of environmental norms (Raines, 2003) . Most of the criticisms focus on the exclusion of minorities -such as indigenous people or womenfrom the negotiations. Industry representatives are also directly interested by environmental 13 It is interesting to note that this category of actors is trying to dissociate itself from the usual reputation given to business groupings. Groups like the Global Industry Coalition for instance insist increasingly in their communication on the diversity of interests they represent so as to demystify their former identity as a North American, big corporations' organisation, strongly opposed to the CBD. Recently, the emergence of a scientific organisation called Public Research and Regulation Initiative partly linked to private interests might be a new strategy of biotechnology companies to have their views taken into account in the negotiations on biosafety. 14 See the CBD Rules of Procedure, http://www.cbd.int/convention/rules.shtml Rule 7: 1. The Secretariat shall notify any body or agency, whether governmental or non-governmental, qualified in fields relating to the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, which has informed the Secretariat of its wish to be represented, of meetings of the Conference of the Parties so that they may be represented as observers unless at least one third of the Parties present at the meeting object. 2. Such observers may, upon invitation of the President, participate without the right to vote in the proceedings of any meeting in matters of direct concern to the body or agency they represent unless at least one third of the Parties present at the meeting object. project of global taxes on private sector activities that she heard about and that, according to her, proves that industries are perceived as "sources of financing" whereas indigenous people are seen as experts. Industry is sent back to the endnotes. When dealing with the business sector, the Secretariat recognises the accuracy of these claims since the private sector was poorly mobilised in Rio and often perceived as a "credit card", but still claims that the CBD has seen some evolution one of which being the B&B meetings 17 . This meetings were precisely about substantive engagement of the private sector.
Yet, there is one difficulty when it comes to involving business in ongoing debates: as mentioned before, all corporations do not equally understand what "participation" means.
Participation can mean the sharing of information, making compromises, as well as launching strong lobbying activities against all kind of decisions. The latter limits considerably the perspective of an improved deliberation.
Some industry representatives' reactions during COP8 betray their main concerns, i.e.
lobbying in defence of their economic interests. One of the first issues raised by the "industry group" to the Secretariat during the COP was the possibility to involve in the debates other departments than ministries of the environment in order to have more competent interlocutors to negotiate with 18 . One part of the group also prepared some amendments to the draft of the decision, which they submitted to governments asking for the reduction of demands for private sector accountability to the minimum. This does not mean that all industry representatives aligned on such positions. During the review of the draft by the "industry group", one of the members representing a company specialised in environmental 16 During COP8, the "industry group" gathered several corporations involved in the negotiations of the convention. There is no strong unity among its members, which come from very different economic sectors, but these meetings are used as a way to gather and exchange information among industry representatives. It comprises industry groups such as the ICC or IPIECA -International Petroleum Industry Association-that have very few links with CEBSD and the B&B initiative. 17 Observation of the "industry group" meeting on the 22nd March 2006. The fact that the private sector asks for participation demonstrates that it recognises the CBD as an important element in their environment and do not put its existence into question. 
Transparency: a problem for or an issue against the private sector?
Transparency is another important element of legitimacy in decision-making processes. It translates into several characteristics: the openness of the debate, the production of detailed reports and the overall quality of communication and information. Transparency is a crucial parameter in the functioning of institutions as it helps building trust among the different stakeholders. It is even more important when dealing with the private sector, the actions of which are often perceived as non transparent.
All the documents elaborated at the B&B meetings -working documents and lists of participants-and the WGRI-1 are accessible through the CBD website. This is noteworthy as the lists of participants to CBD meetings are usually distributed only to those attending the meetings. During COP8, in addition to the debate on the draft decision, the Secretariat, the Brazilian government and the UK government convened a breakfast in order to discuss the different ways through which industry could contribute to the 2010 targets. This meeting gathered representatives of industry and different ministers and participation was on invitation basis. No report of these discussions was made available. This was also the case for 19 The CBD is currently negotiating an international regime under its banner so as to regulate the use of world's genetic resources and ensure the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from their commercialisation. 20 Participation to CBD meetings requires several competences -in law, public relations, science-and resources that can be hard to mobilise for some business actors (interview with Brazilian bioprospecting company). 21 The Secretariat as also been looking into community owned business e.g. through its participation in the UNDP Equator Prize, technical Advisory committee, www.undp.org/equatorinitiative/equatorPrize2006/2006-advisory.htm.
the inter-ministerial segment of the COP, organised by the Brazilian ministry of environment around different workshops in which several industry groups participated, particularly
Brazilian companies. The selection of participants by the organisers of both events renders the process relatively un-transparent; however, the industry groups that were present during COP8 had no particular link with Brazilian representatives. They were consequently not invited 22 and seemed affected by the lack of transparency in the procedure. Several industry representatives saw it as an occasion for Brazilian companies to show off since the COP was taking place in Brazil 23 . However, the B&B continues nowadays and gathers a wide range of industry sectors that produce regularly a review on their activities 24 . Overall, the aim of decision VIII/17 is to improve the exchange of information and views concerning business and biodiversity.
The external dimensions of legitimacy are now going to be considered: institutional effectiveness on the one hand, implementation of the Convention on the other hand.
Institutional effectiveness: from capture to rehabilitation
The institutional effectiveness of the decision is linked to its relation to the enforcement of the existing rules within the CBD, leading ideally to the creation of new opportunities for capacity building. On this topic, the decision generates several criticisms which develop mainly in two directions. Firstly, the concern that environmental regulations would be weakened by actors abnormally influential in the debates and working in domains generally hostile to biodiversity. Secondly, the danger of the privatisation of global environmental governance with a shift in authority from the inter-national system to non-state actors.
Generally, these criticisms merge into the denunciation of an evolution that, by involving actors strongly linked to market interests, neglects the environment and strengthens the dominant neo-liberal vision of globalisation processes (Levy and Newell, 2005: 75) . In sustainable development, governance mechanisms based on private authority -private or semi-private regimes-play a significant role. The privatisation of environmental governance 22 This choice was a prerogative of the Brazilian government. The fact that the COP was taking place in Brazil is also a factor in explaining the wide participation of Brazilian companies. 23 Brazil is the most active countries on the ABS issue asking for a legally binding agreement to be developed under the CBD and disclosure requirements under the TRIPS agreement for patents using genetic resources. It is also a key player in the biosafety negotiations as Brazil is one of the main European Union grain providers. A better definition of the substantial objectives of the partnerships is needed as well as clearer linkage to targets and norms set by the intergovernmental agenda". (Backstrand, 2006: 14) Interestingly, the WBCSD announced, just before the Johannesburg Summit and in a completely different setting, the launch of 95 partnerships involving its members. These partnerships enable corporations to set their own rules outside the control of other organisations 25 . For Norris, in addition to the administrative burden and constraints type II partnerships generates, it is also their reputation as "green washing" initiatives that explains why they have been largely ignored by business representatives (Norris, 2005: 227) .
However, the Secretariat notes that corporations are not the only "bad players" on environmental issues. States are also slow in complying with the CBD. Business' ability to influence states could consequently be put to good use and help fostering environmental protection:
"Individual companies and industry associations can be highly influential on Governments and public opinion; thus, they have the potential to raise the profile of biodiversity and of the Convention itself" .
Institutional integrity is also strongly linked to the financial participation of corporations in conservation. Preparatory documents to decision VIII/17 clarify the spirit in which the involvement of companies could take place: the Convention should not accept any private funding to finance its main activities (Document b2010-01-02-en, p7) and would better benefit from a global effort from the business towards the conservation of biodiversity instead of a few financial contributions (Document b2010-01-02-en, 2006 . The CBD has been negotiated by a handful of convinced officials coming from environment departments.
There are not ready to sell "their Convention" to careless corporations (interview with ENGO representative and SCBD representative).
Implementation and expertise on a case by case basis
The last component of legitimacy resides in the benefits decision VIII/17 would bring for the preservation of global biodiversity in line with the CBD objectives. The concrete results of the Convention on biodiversity are difficult to assess: it covers lots of different domains that are characterised by complex dynamics and interactions. To add to this complexity, international environmental agreements usually define general norms and principles which consequences aren't easily measurable.
deforestation and working conditions. This certification would compete with the criteria of non-GM standard production.
The involvement of business is not perceived by the Secretariat as a "miracle" solution for the conservation of biodiversity. The 2010 target is difficult to achieve in any case. However, the involvement of business could be a necessary condition for some progress in the the political process of decision-making, science was given the precedence to inform political choices. Expertise, as the practical arm of science, was seen more as a tool for implementation.
However, questions concerning the objectivity of science and expertise have been raised increasingly as more environmental agreements emerged (Elliot 2004: 114-116) . First of all because science, that claimed to be neutral, could not escape the political trap. Every kind of "scientific" judgement is dependant on precise expectations and particular questions that are defined in a political way. Moreover, the activities of scientists are often linked to the decisions they defend. Finally, science is largely disconnected from economical, technical or social realities in society. Expertise, that requires field knowledge and should consequently achieve a better integration of all these questions, often stays away from social issues as well.
Therefore an increasing number of groups, especially from civil society, claim to be experts very much like their government counterparts. They also stress the importance of local knowledge to complement science in a more balanced system of global norms (Gupta 2004).
According to the Secretariat, the idea is to benefit from business' expertise and to involve corporations in concrete projects. Industries produce lots of data concerning environmental assessment. This is the case for mining industries that put in place biodiversity indicators. In other domains, business organisations can also provide interesting information on the applicability of environmental norms, e.g. the conditions under which seeds are currently transported internationally or the current contractual basis of bioprospecting agreements.
Industrial representatives agreed on their potential role in advising legislators on sustainable development issues. Interestingly, some disagreements within the industry group emerged on the definition of that expertise: for instance one industry representative stated that ENGOs were coming to the negotiations to defend causes, whereas industries were there to make profit. This is where business expertise and skills lie. In the history of the Convention, several developments confirm his statement. Corporations tried several time to lobby for the notion of "accurate science" to protect their interests against claims of environmental degradation. This is particularly the case for biotechnology (Steffenhagen, 2001) where a large segment of research is controlled by the private sector. The adoption of the Cartagena protocol has been perceived by these companies as a major failure, since their aggressive positions did not convince the majority of participants (Bled, 2007) . However, just after the adoption of the treaty, these actors choose to launch several research programs to develop new GMO technology -including restricting technologies to have a better control on production-, as well as initiatives of biosafety capacity-building in the developing world. These measures aimed officially at mitigating the issues of potential transfer between GMOs and non GMOs and helping developing countries in their establishment of biosafety regulations. In reality, they served as a guarantee of a return on investment biotechnology firms had made in genetic engineering as well as a seduction strategy towards weak developing countries.
The expertise issue seems nevertheless to have to be considered on a case by case basis.
Expertise is for instance currently at the core of the ABS regime, with discussions on an internationally recognised certificate indicating the origin of the natural resource components contained in products introduced on the market. In such case, business expertise can be crucial and several initiatives and lessons learned previously by biotechnology companies with the Cartagena protocol will probably help to promote a more constructive dialogue on this new issue.
To mention a middle-stance case in relation to the conservation of biological diversity, several initiatives of business organisations are in the periphery of what could be considered in line with the Convention's objectives. This is the case for a partnership presented during COP8 and involving the ENGO Nature Conservancy and the agribusiness corporation
Cargill, involved in GMO production, both working with farmers to encourage better management practices and conservation opportunities for natural habitat of critical importance situated on private lands. This last example illustrates the danger to have private initiatives evolving at the margins of the CBD.
Conclusion: the plural dynamics of legitimacy
Our analysis of decision VIII/17 of the CBD on the further involvement of the private sector in the Convention shed some light on the dynamics of legitimacy and legitimisation currently at stake within the CBD.
Going back to our initial proposition, the legitimacy of decision VIII/17 resides in several parameters, which consideration helps to identify the potential issues at stake. So far, the dynamics generated by decision VIII/17 do not seen to announce the privatisation of CBD arrived late and lobbied aggressively to stop the Cartagena negotiations which gave them a pretty bad reputation in the CBD process they are now trying to overcome. In another perspective, bioprospecting companies that were initially participating in ABS discussions faced some strong critics from several delegations and ENGOs and decided to leave the meetings. In both cases, the political environment in which they evolved did not fully integrate them into CBD discussions. To overcome this difficulty, some new initiatives such as the B&B initiative or the negotiations for an international regime on ABS are trying to bring business back in more constructive discussions. 
